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Public vs Private Sector Compensation 
Gilbert Levine 
Now that the Anti Inflation Board wage controls are being phased out, 
the Government of Canada is putting forward a new form of wage controls 
for public employées. 
This time if s called ACTC. That stands for Average Comparability of 
Total Compensation - a term which we will hear with increasing frequency 
in the months and years to corne. 
It was first proposed on March 8, 1978 by the Government in the form 
of Bill C-28, "An Act to Amend the Public Service Staff Relations Act". If 
enacted, no doubt the fédéral government will put strong pressure on crown 
corporations, provincial and municipal governments to follow the lead. 
ACTC is a formula devised by fédéral technicians which is purported 
to measure the total cost of both wages and fringe benefits of public 
employées. The total compensation of comparable jobs with a représen-
tative sample of private sector employées will similarly be measured as a 
means of ensuring that pay rates in the Public Sector never exceed rates in 
the private sector. 
The proposed scheme calls for costing thirteen wage and fringe benefit 
éléments and comparing them, occupation by occupation, with those in the 
private sector. 
The thirteen éléments to be compared include: 
1. Wages and salaries 
2. Pensions (including indexing provisions & supplementary retirement 
benefits) 
3. Life insurance 
4. Disability insurance 
5. Severance pay 
6. Supplementary health insurance 
7. Employer's share of provincial health insurance 
8. Sick leave/sickness indemnity plans 
9. Paid holidays 
10. Vacation leave 
11. Scheduled hours of work 
12. Paid rest periods 
13. Overtime 
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Under this proposai, the total average compensation of private sector 
workers would be established using the techniques developed by the A.I.B. 
Comparable public sector employées would then be given the total amount 
of compensation, i.e. the new "guidelines", for which they would be allow-
ed to bargain. 
Accordingly, negotiations would be limited to bargaining for the ap-
propriate mix of total compensation, i.e., wages relative to fringe benefits. 
In other words, unions would only be able to bargain on how the pie is to be 
eut. There would be no bargaining on the size of the pie. 
Another feature of the scheme would include spécifie guidelines 
whereby arbitrators in interest disputes would be required to follow the 
ACTC formula in their awards. 
Bill C-28 is falsely trying to accuse public employées for the économie 
mess we are in today. If that lie succeeds, it will take the heat off the cor-
porations and their governments, who are the real creators of unemploy-
ment and inflation. 
This new gimmick is ail part of a continuing propoganda lie that public 
employée wage increases in récent year s hâve sparked inflation in Canada. 
But the facts hâve consistently shown that pay increases for public 
employées hâve never lead, but always followed, increases in industry: 
Percentage wage increases in public sector wage settlements were less 
than private sector settlements in every year between 1968 and 1974. It was 
only in 1975, when public sector unions began to "catch up" to industrial 
workers, that the Government imposed wage controls. 
In the eight years prior to the introduction of wage controls the average 
annual percentage increase in base rates in new settlements in the private 
sector totalled 81.0 percent. For the public sector it was 81.5 percent. 
Therefore, the annual average differential between public and private sector 
wage settlements was less than one-tenth of one percent. 
In comparing wage settlements between the public and private sectors 
since the start of collective bargaining in the fédéral public service in 1968 
until the third quarter of 1976, the Honorable John Munro, Minister of 
Labour recently stated: 
"The fédéral public service is trailing marginally behind the major 
bargaining units of the private sector. The public service, including ail 
levels of government, is only marginally ahead of the major bargaining 
units of the private sector. Some of the increases in the provincial and 
municipal wage levels in this period can be accounted for by the fact that 
public employées obtained bargaining rights relatively recently and were 
using their bargaining power to catch up to private industry wage 
levels."1 
î From an address to the National Convention of the Canadian Merchant Service 
Guild, Vancouver, Mardi 8, 1978. 
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In spite of this ACTC brings forth the concept that profit rnaking 
private industry must be the "leader" in wages and benefits. Employées 
who provide public services must then follow. 
This is a wrong concept on two grounds: 
1. Rates of pay should not only be set on the basis of skill, responsibility, 
effort, éducation, working conditions, etc., but also on the basis of the 
social value of the job in the community. For example, a floor sweeper 
who provides a useful community service in a hospital should be paid 
more than a floor sweeper in a chewing gum factory. That's not the 
case now. Rates of pay of public employées, who perform work that in 
many cases is so essential that they are forbidden by law to strike, 
should not hâve to follow rates of pay for non-essential workers. 
2. Instead of always following the private sector, public employers should 
be free to be MODEL employers, to be followed by the rest of the com-
munity. Governments as employers should be free to introduce new 
concepts of industrial relations and new ideas on working conditions 
and benefits, as they hâve done in the past. Many years ago govern-
ments provided their employées with paid vacations, paid sick leave and 
pensions, long before they were known in private industry. If we had 
waited for private industry to introduce thèse concepts, they may still 
be unknown today in Canada. 
What are some of the dangers of ACTC for public employée unions? 
EVERYTHING IS NOT BEING COMPARED 
The factors to be compared between public employées and private 
employers hâve been restricted by the fédéral government formula. When 
the Honorable Robert Andras, Président of the Fédéral Treasury Board met 
with officers of the Canadian Labour Congress in February to discuss the 
ACTC formula, he was asked if the Government also intended to match 
non monetary benefits of public employées with benefits which apply in in-
dustry. The CLC officers had in mind the right to strike, the right to 
negotiate on pensions, on promotions, on job classifications etc. Andras 
replied that the Government would décide on the éléments to be compared 
and there was no intention to match thèse matters with industrial 
employées. 
NO GUARANTEE OF OBJECTIVE STATISTICS UNDER ACTC 
Unions and Governments will not likely be able to agrée on which 
private employers would be included in a représentative sample for com-
parison purposes. Nor will there be much agreement on job matches. But 
under ACTC Governments, as employers, will assume the responsibility of 
collecting "the facts" on average wage comparability. Where there will be a 
disagreement between the government and a union on any aspect of the 
sample, a government agency will make the décision. Governments, or their 
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agencies like the Pay Research Bureau, will sélect the companies to be 
surveyed, will sélect the job matches between the public and private 
employers and will also make ail the calculations. This is on a par with one 
team (The Government) in a hockey match being allowed to make and 
amend the rules (The Public Service Staff Relations Act), to sélect the facts 
(Pay Research Bureau), to appoint the référée (the Arbitrator) in its game 
against the other team (the Unions). 
How will a Union bargaining with the Government as an employer be 
able to détermine the value of total compensation of the bargaining unit? It 
is obvious that it would be impossible for the Union to obtain accurate in-
formation when the Government has ail the records. It is also obvious that 
the Union would hâve to accept whatever the Government says the group 
would be entitled to. Surely, this is not a fair approach to bargaining. 
Anyone who has negotiated with public employers in récent years will 
know how governments, as employers, hâve distorted survey "facts" to 
their own benefit in bargaining. 
The people with the most "know how" in costing wages and benefits in 
Canada are the technicians of the A.I.B. Thèse "experts" in rolling back 
the hard won gains of workers will now be recruited as the impartial com-
pensation surveyors of the new ACTC. Is it any wonder that trade unionists 
will be suspicious of the whole scheme? 
COMPLICATIONS IN COMPARABILITY 
Even if the principle of wage comparisons based on total compensation 
was correct, the complications of gathering accurate compensation infor-
mation are immense. Part of the difficulty stems from the fact that most 
employers do not keep accurate compensation records. Many items of com-
pensation in the private sector, such as subsidized meals, Christmas and 
other bonuses, discounts, mortgage loans, stock options etc. are difficult to 
measure. It is erroneous to assume that ail éléments of compensation are 
measurable in accounting terms. 
The United State Public Service Commission has been examing the 
total compensation approach for some time. That body recently stated that 
it still needed several more years of experimenting before it might be con-
sidered valid. Could Canada's speed in entering the scheme be a case of 
"fools rush in where angels fear to tread?" 
COSTING PROBLEMS UNDER ACTC 
Agreement between unions and government employers on "costing" 
of wages and benefits under ACTC will be difficult, or impossible. For ex-
ample, assuming that a government matches a 6% employée contribution to 
a pension plan, it would mark that down as a 6% payroll expenditure. But 
most governments use this pension money to invest in their own opérations. 
In effect, they "lend" themselves money at greatly reduced rates of interest. 
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This would hâve the effect of reducing the real pension cost by approx-
imately one-half. As such, the 6°7o payroll pension "cost" charged as com-
pensation against the union may only cost the employer 3% in real terms. 
One of the thirteen "costed" items under ACTC is overtime. Where a 
union negotiates an improvement in overtime premiums from the standard 
time and one half to double time, it would be charged for the "cost" of this 
improvement. However, if this increased penalty against the employer 
causes him to hire additional employées at straight time rates and eliminate 
ail overtime premiums, will this be considered as a reduced cost to the 
employer? Not under ACTC. Similarly, if the introduction of a rest period 
"costed" at 3% of payroll results in an increase in productivity of 5%, 
ACTC would still consider this as a new cost at 3%, when, in actual fact, 
costs hâve been reduced. 
ACTC WILL BE BASED ON DATED MATERIAL 
In the past, the government as a bargainer has relied on wage and 
benefit surveys of the previous year to détermine wage rates for public 
employées for the foliowing year. This will continue under ACTC. Public 
employer offers will always be based on wage material that is several years 
out of date. Therefore, with private sector unions demanding large wage in-
creases to meet inflation, public employée unions under ACTC will always 
lag behind. 
CORPORATIONS HAVE A STAKE IN ACTC 
As a means of covering up its own bad image, the corporate sector in 
récent years has been campaigning strongly against the conditions of 
employment in the public sector. If the corporate sector is successful in 
keeping down public sector wages and benefits, there will be less demand to 
improve the pay and benefits of its own employées. (Indeed, this may well 
be the rationale of pressure on government by corporations to bring in 
ACTC.) If industrial employers know that the statistics they supply on wage 
comparability will be used to set wages and benefits for public employées, 
there will be a strong pressure on them to feed biased information into a 
survey. They will tend to highlight poor wages and conditions and this 
would seriously affect the validity of any comparisons. 
UNDER ACTC MANY MATTERS ARE NOT NEGOTIABLE 
Once the total compensation is determined through ACTC, will a 
public employée union be free to détermine how the compensation is divid-
ed between wages and benefits? Not exactly. Many of the public sector 
benefits are determined by législation which is not subject to collective 
bargaining. For example, where the law says the employer shall pay 6% of 
an employée's wages into a pension, the union will not be able to say in 
bargaining that it would prefer to forgo the 6% and take 3 extra weeks vaca-
tion with pay. 
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Even in matters not covered by législation, there may well be many 
rigidities built into the System of ACTC. One doubts whether the Govern-
ment would allow every bargaining unit to choose its own mix of total com-
pensation. Would it allow one bargaining unit to give up two 15 minute rest 
periods and eut the working day by half an hour? Or another group to 
eliminate rest periods in exchange for three extra weeks vacation? If that's 
what bargaining on total compensation really means, it could really end up 
in a wide variety of compensation packages. 
NO IMMEDIATE CATCH UP UNDER ACTC 
If the ACTC formula shows that the compensation of a particular 
classification in the public sector is substantially behind a comparable 
private sector position, will Bill C-28 provide for an immédiate catch up? 
Not necessarily. The proposed amendment to the PSSR Act states: 
"If the existing aggregate of compensation is substantially less than that 
for similar or analogous occupations or work, any arbitral award 
rendered shall provide for the graduai élimination of the différences, tak-
ing into account the relative magnitude of the différence and the 
prévalent rate of increase in aggregate of compensation outside the public 
service." 
ACTC WILL MAKE BARGAINING RIGID 
The total compensation formula is similar to the A.I.B. arithmetic 
guidelines which are also based on an aggragate of pay, benefits, and other 
conditions of employment. With limits placed on compensation during the 
A.I.B., some unionists thought they would be able to concentrate their 
bargaining on non-wage working conditions and make some important 
breakthroughts. In fact, the opposite proved true. The imposition of total 
compensation under the A.I.B. removed the flexibility from collective 
bargaining. The A.I.B. has demonstrated that minimal, if any, progress can 
be made in improving working conditions when the compensation is frozen 
into one package. Similarly ACTC will not only freeze compensation 
bargaining, but it will also freeze bargaining on key non wage issues, such as 
job security, safety, promotions, etc. 
ACTC WILL LEAD TO COMPUTERIZED BARGAINING 
ACTC will lead to what may be called "computerized collective 
bargaining". Wage and fringe benefit facts will be placed in a computer, 
which will then spit out "the facts" on what changes may be allowed in a 
collective agreement. Gone will be the rôle of the active rank and file 
member and steward. Unions will cease to exist as effective organizations. 
Bargaining in the public sector will become highly bureaucratie exercise. It 
will be the préserve of the technocrats, with little meaning to the member-
ship. 
134 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 35. NO 1 (1980) 
Once the ACTC system is operational, governments will likely bring 
pressure to bear to decertify public employée unions. The argument will go: 
"Now that we hâve a "fair" system of comparisons and the computer is 
working well, you do no need a union any more. 
ACTC WILL LOWER THE STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 
In the past, the fédéral government has stated that it should compare 
its conditions of employment with those in effect with gootf employers. This 
normally meant comparisons which did not include small employers with 
poor working conditions. Now under ACTC, the government wants com-
parisons to be made with ail employers, large and small, unionized and non-
unionized, and with good and bad conditions. This new concept of an 
"average" will certainly hâve the effect of lowering the standard of public 
employées. 
In accordance with the Public Service Staff Relations Act, guidelines to 
arbitrators in the past hâve been flexible and were on the basis of the "need 
to establish terms and conditions of employment that are fair and 
reasonable in relation to the qualifications required, the work performed, 
the responsibility assumed and the nature of the services rendered". 
Under section 68 of the PSSR Act, an interest dispute arbitrator or 
negotiator could set wage rates based "on the needs of the public service for 
qualified employées". It appears that the Government no longer considers 
this need important. With Bill C-28, this section of the Act would be deleted 
and be replaced by the simple comparability formula. This would complete-
ly tie the hands of government recruitment officers who would no longer be 
able to improve salaries to attract qualified employées who are in short sup-
ply. Another example of this Government putting the needs of the private 
sector first! 
ACTC WILL WEAKEN UNIONS 
Labour unions are not merely économie organizations to bargain for 
wages and fringe benefits. Unions also serve to défend workers' rights on 
the job, such as grievances, promotions, discipline, occupational health and 
safety etc. Unions are also organizations to bring about social and political 
change. Déniais of free collective bargaining on économie issues, will 
weaken the effectiveness of labour unions on ail other matters as well. 
ACTC will weaken a union's ability to fight for justice on and off the job. 
ACTC IS DISCRIMINATORY AGAINST WOMEN PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 
The récent passage by the Fédéral Government of the Canadian 
Human Rights Act has been hailed as a progressive move. Section II of the 
Act provides for the principle of equal pay for work of equal value. 
However, Bill C-28 is directly opposed to the principle of equal pay for 
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work of equal value. As such, this législation discriminâtes against public 
service women and adds a new level of wage controls on them. 
The Trudeau Government is taking away with one hand (Bill C-28), 
what it gave with the other (Human Rights Act). In order to hâve any mean-
ing whatsoever, the comparison of equal pay for work of equal value must 
be made within the same company or place of work. Yet Bill C-28 
establishes a principle of comparing occupations between companies, i.e., 
between unionized government employées and non-unionized private sector 
employées. Instead of comparing the worth of a public service female 
clérical worker with the worth of a higher paid maie public servant, the 
Government now proposes to compare her with the clericals employed in 
banks, insurance companies and retail trade, where unionization is virtually 
nil. Thus, women in clérical and secretarial jobs in the unionized public sec-
tor will hâve a new wage ceiling. That wage ceiling will be the average pay of 
clérical jobs in private industry, where most women are unorganized. 
In other words, public sector women will hâve their wage rates tied to 
the job ghetto rates of low paid jobs in private industry, where employers 
profit by discriminating against women. 
This is directly contrary to the principle of comparison within the 
establishment, as defined in the equal pay section of the Canadian Human 
Rights Act. 
ACTC WILL PIT WORKER AGAINST WORKER 
By telling industrial workers that public employées are the cause of in-
flation and other économie problems, Governments are, in effect, seeking 
the support of industrial unions to keep down the wages and benefits of 
public employées. Therefore, ACTC is designed to pit the private employée 
against the public employée. In a labour movement divided between public 
and private employées, both will lose. No group of workers gains by 
holding down the wages of another group. 
ACTC MAY LEAD TO REGIONAL OR ZONAL RATES 
Section 68 of Bill C-28 directs arbitrators, and presumably government 
negotiators, to take "fair and reasonable account of... relevant 
geographical... and other éléments of the aggragate of compensation". This 
appears like the thin edge of the wedge towards régional and zonal rates of 
pay. This in turn could lead to the break-up of national bargaining units 
and the further widening of income disparities between the various régions 
of Canada. 
COMPARING POOR WITH POOR WILL NOT BRING JUSTICE 
Unions should reject comparing the poor wages of one group of 
workers against the poor wages of another group of workers with the con-
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clusion that justice prevails because both groups are equally poorly paid. If 
the Government is so keen on comparisons, maybe comparisons should be 
made with those éléments in society that do not work. This would include 
investors, coupon clippers, land speculators and other socially useless per-
sons who produce nothing but who receive the highest per capita income. 
For ail of the above reasons, and many more, public employée unions 
will reject Average Comparability of Total Compensation as a new wrinkle 
in the Government's attempt to control public employée wages. 
Unions will continue to look upon this new technique as a management 
negotiating tool to inflate and distort the real cost of a union's bargaining 
proposai. 
Effective unions will bargain for wages and benefits, instead of 
bargaining on the basis of total compensation. They will bargain for collec-
tive agreement provisions and benefits on their merits and on the needs of 
their members, regardless of some distorted management cost estimâtes. 
Une étude sur une forme 
de pollution de plus en plus menaçante 
LE BRUIT INDUSTRIEL 
Ses méfaits et son contrôle 
par Guy LESCOUFLAIR 
En un texte qu'il a voulu rendre accessible au plus grand nombre, Guy 
Lescouflair, chef audiologiste au Centre hospitalier de l'université Laval, pro-
pose d'intéressantes solutions au problème du bruit industriel. Tout en souli-
gnant la nécessité d'une planification d'ensemble de plusieurs champs de la 
connaissance humaine, il montre comment le contrôle du bruit est une chose 
relativement aisée et rentable sur les plans financier, ergonomique et social. 
216 pages, 80 figures, 21 tableaux, $14. 
LES PRESSES DE L'UNIVERSITÉ LAVAL 
C.P. 2447, Québec G1K 7R4 
